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Theories of environmental outcomes have been developed mostly through large-N cross-
national studies, which have a structuralist bias and do not include the mechanisms through
which inferred causes operate.  Structured, focused case studies can help overcome those limits
by incorporating political processes and identifying causal mechanisms.  Here, comparisons of
climate policy outcomes within Germany are used to test and develop theory, by explaining the
differences among nine cases with the help of process tracing.  The findings suggest that
environmental-outcome theories should be modified to include:  external events and advocacy-
coalition formation as key processes; multiple causal paths through which green parties improve
environmental quality; more examination of the ways that neocorporatism can hinder
environmental performance and that advocacy-coalition formation can change patterns of interest
intermediation; and rising income and consumption as factors producing environmental
deterioration in the absence of policies regulating consumption.
Keywords:  advocacy coalitions; climate policy; consumption; external events; environmental
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While many scholars have described and explained climate policies in rich industrialized
countries,1 there has been less work explaining the policy outcomes, i.e., changes in greenhouse-
gas emissions.2  This is surprising since environmental outcomes presumably are one of the main
ultimate concerns of those interested in environmental policy, and fairly reliable greenhouse-gas
emissions data are readily available.  Explanations of changes in emissions will probably be quite
different from explanations of climate policies,3 since not all climate policies contribute equally
to improvements, some improvements are not due to climate policies, and other factors may
counteract the effects of even the most successful policies.
Hence, the approach here is to begin with environmental outcomes (changes in
greenhouse-gas emissions) and work backwards to causes, which include climate policies, other
government interventions, the factors that shape policy-making and implementation, and other
causes that affect emissions, such as socioeconomic trends.  My aim is to contribute to theorizing
about environmental outcomes in areas of persistent environmental problems, by conducting
comparative analysis of nine cases within one country, defined mainly in policy and sectoral
terms.  This approach is meant to complement cross-national large-N studies and help overcome
their limitations.4
Germany is a good country to study in order to develop and test theories of these
phenomena, since it is the world's sixth largest greenhouse-gas emitter and a leader in reductions.
 It reduced its emissions by 22% from 1990 to 2008 and is on track to surpass its ambitious
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Kyoto commitment of a 21% reduction in the 2008-12 period.5  Because its emissions reductions
exceed those of all other Western countries, Germany is usually seen as a climate-policy success,
but closer examination shows that it includes a mixture of partial successes and failures.6  Both
are grist for the theoretical mill.
The next section will explain the importance of theorizing about environmental outcomes
and using case-study evidence to do so, and will lay out the theoretical issues that the case study
will address.  Then, I briefly describe German climate policies and the immediate sources of
Germany's reductions in greenhouse-gas emissions, in terms of nine cases that include areas of
major success, relative failure, and stalemate.  Next, I develop a causal explanation of each case
in turn, searching for process mechanisms that have been left out of the cross-national studies
and that could link theoretical factors to the outcomes.  The conclusions will return to the
theoretical issues raised initially.
Theories of Environmental Outcomes
Why outcomes?  Why comparisons within one country?  Why these theoretical issues?
It is not clear why political scientists have paid less attention to the outcomes of
environmental policies than to the policies themselves.7  Obtaining comparable, valid measures
of environmental outcomes for many countries is often challenging, but this problem is much
smaller in studies of one or a few countries.  Also, it does not apply in the area of climate
protection, since fairly reliable and consistent data on greenhouse-gas emissions in industrialized
countries are available.8  Another argument against a focus on outcomes is that they are often
influenced by factors out of the control of policy-makers, such as new technologies, industrial
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restructuring, or recessions.9  While true to an extent, it is often possible to separate the effects of
policies designed to achieve environmental goals from the effects of other factors, and to
understand better how politics and policy making are involved in what appear to be extraneous
factors.  Examining all the causes of environmental outcomes may point toward unexpected
levers for achieving better outcomes and to limits on explicitly designed government policies,
which are also important to understand.
Although they make valuable contributions, large-N studies of environmental outcomes10
have several limitations.  First, the studies are biased toward structural explanations based on
geographic and socioeconomic structures or political institutions.  Collectively, they find that the
factors which most consistently correlate with national environmental outcomes are population
density, income per capita, institutions that concentrate political power or require consensus
(there is disagreement here), perhaps corporatist interest-group systems (again, there is
disagreement), and strong green or left-libertarian parties.  Large-N studies have focused on
structural factors partly because those are easier to investigate with comparable and reliable
cross-national data than are political processes.  Another reason is that these studies often rely on
cross-sectional rather than longitudinal data, which have difficulty capturing change.11  As a
result, even factors such as income and green-party strength, which can be interpreted as dynamic
variables, themselves strongly influenced by other political and economic processes, tend to be
treated and presented as structural factors that vary between countries but are otherwise relatively
fixed.
Second, the large-N studies rely on correlations between causal factors and environmental
outcomes in order to infer causation, an approach that has several important limitations. 
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Available data may be poor proxies for what is meant to be measured, and statistically significant
correlations do not always indicate causation.  In any case, correlations do not by themselves
provide an account of the mechanisms through which the factors operate.12 Another problem is
that countries are treated in a highly aggregated way, as data points that indicate success, failure,
or some point in between.  This obscures the complexities of environmental performance over
time and across economic sectors, policy areas, and regions.
Structured, focused comparisons of cases within one country, or of a few countries, can
help to overcome those limitations and to develop theory, in several ways.  First, political and
socioeconomic processes can be more fully included in the qualitative analysis of a small number
of cases, even though there is no comparable information presently available for a large number
of countries.13  Second, the mechanisms or processes that could link putative causes to the
environmental outcomes can be investigated through process tracing within each case.  If the
mechanisms are not present or are different from those expected by the theory, or if the theory
did not specify any mechanisms, the case study suggests modification to the theory.14  Third,
where scholars disagree about how a factor affects environmental outcomes, e.g., as for
affluence, governmental institutions, or neocorporatism, case studies can provide good reasons
for preferring one hypothesis over another on the basis of observed mechanisms.  Fourth, case
studies can also generate new hypotheses about the effects of combinations of variables, by
examining how they interact in the generation of particular outcomes.
Furthermore, although comparative analysis is often conflated with cross-national
comparisons, of course comparison is possible within a single country case.  In this paper,
sectoral, policy, and east-west regional distinctions are used to identify nine cases within
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Germany.  When German climate policy is seen not a monotonic success to be explained, but
rather as a patchwork of partial successes and partial failures, new variance can be identified and
used to test and develop causal theories.
While Duit notes that the literature on environmental outcomes has not been strongly
guided by a theoretical framework, this may be because no single framework is broad enough to
encompass all the causes that operate.15  Analysts have applied a wide range of theoretical
approaches to this area and have advanced a wide range of causal factors, including geographic
and economic structures, political and economic institutions, and political mobilization.16  To
deal with this abundance, this paper will focus on four theoretical areas where the present case
studies can help to specify mechanisms and adjudicate between contradictory findings.
Neocorporatist or pluralist interest-group systems
Neocorporatist systems are characterized by a small number of economic interest
organizations that represent a large share of the population, are organized in peak associations,
are consulted by government, and have cooperative and consensual relations with each other and
with government.  The literature reaches conflicting conclusions about the effects of
neocorporatism on environmental outcomes.  In one view, neocorporatism helps produce more
effective environmental policies by helping to overcome potential opposition and resistance from
associations of businesses, farmers, and unions in highly polluting sectors.  These stand to lose
from national environmental policies that increase their costs, especially in the presence of
international competition.  However, proponents of neocorporatism argue that it can help
overcome this opposition by compensating losers, communicating the benefits of environmental
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policies to members, creating consensus, and hence reducing freeriding and promoting the
internalization of externalities.  By contrast, in a pluralist system, the economic actors that would
be harmed by environmental policies tend to lobby successfully for preferential treatment,
allowing them to impose external costs on others.17
But others argue that neocorporatist institutions harm environmental quality, because they
institutionalize the power of producer groups and keep environmental issues off the agenda in
favor of a consensus on economic growth.  Hence, pluralist interest-group systems may offer
better chances for new environmental issues and groups.18  These effects may be especially
strong for climate policies, which target the consumption of energy from fossil-fuel sources and
hence provoke broad opposition from economic interest groups, most of which are involved in
the supply or consumption of fossil-fuel-based energy, including manufacturing industry.  While
some sectors would benefit from stronger climate policy (renewable energy, nuclear energy, and
insurance), they are comparatively weak.19  Hence, institutions that empower producer groups
will tend to brake climate policies.
The empirical findings of the large-N studies have been mixed on this issue.  While most
show a correlation between neocorporatism and environmental outcomes,20 others find no
significant relationship,21 or even a negative, though not robust, correlation.22
Given the conflicting results, case studies of policy areas where neocorporatist institutions
have been active may shed some light.  Germany has a moderately strong corporatist pattern of
interest intermediation and a consensual policy style, which extends to environmental policy.23 
Business is strongly organized in peak associations, including the Federation of German Industry
(BDI) and the German Chambers of Industry and Commerce (DIHK), and the federal economics
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ministry is very responsive to them.24  While rankings of neocorporatism tend to show Germany
around the middle of the pack compared with other Western democracies, this is somewhat
misleading.  When countries are assigned numeric scores, Germany places much closer to the
most strongly neocorporatist countries, such as Austria, than to pluralist nations such as the U.K.,
at about 80 or 85 on a 0-100 scale.25  Hence, if neocorporatism is a help or a hindrance to
environmental performance, or both, this should be visible in cases where German peak
associations have been active in environmental policies.
Green parties
Green parties include explicitly ecological parties and left-socialist parties that have
adopted strong environmental programs.  Several large-N studies find that green-party strength is
correlated with stronger environmental performance,26 although Scruggs and Armingeon found
only statistically insignificant effects.27  The Greens have been relatively strong in Germany,
holding more than 5% and an average of 7.5% of the Bundestag seats since 1983.  Hence, in the
case studies, I will examine whether this party's actions are linked to emissions reductions and, if
so, will investigate the likely mechanisms.  Since a correlation has been found between
environmental outcomes and the vote shares or parliamentary seat shares of green parties, a likely
mode of influence is by triggering innovation by larger parties.  Another possibility, which can be
examined in the German cases, is that their participation in government improves environmental
performance.
Income and economic development
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There has been considerable debate about whether high incomes and other features of
economic development improve or worsen environmental quality.28  The "environmental
Kuznets curve" view is that rising levels of economic development and prosperity produce major
changes that promote better environmental outcomes:  a shift away from industrial production;
increased perceptions of environmental problems and demands for addressing them; and the
financial resources, institutions, and technological capacities for solving them.  By contrast, in
the "prosperity-pollution" view, economic activity in industrial societies degrades the
environment because higher incomes result in increased production and consumption in absolute
terms, even if the proportion of industrial activity declines.
There is much evidence is that the relationship between income and environmental
conditions depends on the nature of the environmental problem.  Jänicke and colleagues argue
that improvements occur with rising incomes only if a relatively inexpensive technical solution is
available for the problem, e.g., for reducing SOX and particulate pollution or increasing sewage
treatment.29  If such a solution is not available and effective policies would harm the interests of
powerful polluters (e.g., in volatile organic chemical pollution, municipal waste, or
deforestation), rising incomes lead to more pollution.
Greenhouse-gas emissions usually have been seen as a prosperity-pollution case rather than
as one subject to an environmental Kuznets curve.30  However, at first glance, the German case
seems to support the Kuznets thesis for greenhouse-gas emissions, since emissions have peaked
and begun to decline there.  The analysis of specific German cases will make it possible to
explore whether and how rising income affect outcomes in this area.
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Advocacy-coalition formation
Political processes have been largely neglected by large-N studies of environmental
outcomes.  Although some of them include variables related to political processes, they do so in a
static way rather than examining change over time.31  For example, Scruggs found that a
mobilization index made up of environmental group membership, votes for green parties, and
public opinion measures did not correlate significantly with environmental outcomes.32  By
contrast, Jahn found that a new-politics index based on a history of a strong nuclear-energy
conflict, environmental-movement strength, and votes for green parties did correlate with
improvements.33  In both studies, the political processes were measured at only one point in time
and the mechanisms through which these variables might operate were not examined.
Although it is not captured in those studies, advocacy-coalition formation and development
are political processes that may play a role in climate-policy outcomes.  A large body of work has
identified the formation of advocacy coalitions as important in environmental policy areas,
including energy and climate protection.34  In part, this theory states that policy change by
authoritative decision-makers is a result of the relative strength of the coalitions comprising
advocates and opponents of a policy direction.35  Both kinds of coalition draw on specialists in a
variety of governmental and private organizations, including government agencies, parties,
parliaments, interest groups, non-profit organizations, movement organizations, research
institutions, and media outlets.  Events external to the particular policy system, such as
socioeconomic developments or changes in the composition of government, can affect the
composition of advocacy coalitions as well as their resources and constraints.36  The coalitions'
beliefs and strategies are not fixed and can be affected by the outcomes of policies.37  In the case
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studies, I will consider whether advocacy coalitions can help explain policy changes that led to
major changes in Germany's emissions.
Defining Cases Within Germany
Germany's leading role in international greenhouse-gas negotiations has gone hand in hand
with relatively strong domestic climate policies,38 which have enjoyed the support of a broad
range of governing parties.  These policies helped Germany achieve significant reductions in
greenhouse-gas emissions, greater than those in any other Western country.  Compared with the
1990 baseline, Germany had reduced its emissions by 22% in 2008, even before the surge in
energy prices and worldwide recession in 2008-10 sharply reduced its emissions and those of
most industrialized countries.  Among western countries, only Britain's decrease of 18% came
close to Germany's, and the performances of the entire EU-15 (-4%) and the U.S. (+17%) over
this period were much worse than Germany's.39
However, Germany's 22% aggregate reduction during the 1990-2008 period conceals a
number of more specific areas of success and failure, which become visible when its
performance is analyzed into cases defined by policy areas and sectors.  Table 1 shows how the
most important interventions by the German government affected emissions, compared with
"business as usual" scenarios, i.e., continued economic growth in the absence of the
interventions.  The table includes the most important policies that were designed to reduce
emissions as well as other interventions that had significant effects.  These figures rely on the
estimates of government agencies, research institutes, and academic researchers; in one case
where sources disagreed, I averaged their estimates.40  Although they are affected by the
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assumptions made about business-as-usual scenarios, the estimates are not very controversial and
are plausible given the magnitudes claimed in relation to the absolute changes in emissions. 
They are likely to be accurate enough for the purpose here, which is simply to identify successes
and failures rather than to make precise estimates. 
Table 1:  Estimated relative contributions of major government interventions to Germany's reductions in Kyoto
greenhouse gas emissions, 1990-2008
Source of reduction or increase Emissions
reduced










Eastern German economic transformation* -112.9  31%
Renewable energy policies** -109.0  30%
Waste regulations and biomass ordinance regarding methane -30.0    8%
Voluntary agreement with adipic acid producers regarding NO2 -26.0    7%
Residential building ordinances -24.3    7%
Ecological tax reform -17.4    5%
Industrial ordinances for energy saving, cogeneration development -15.0    4%
Transportation policies -9.5    3%
Voluntary agreements with industry regarding CO2 and emissions
trading
-8.4    2%
Coal mining regulations regarding methane -7.3    2%
Subtotal:  all reductions attributed to government action -359.8 100%
CO2 reductions due to increased energy efficiency not driven by
policies, reduced carbon content of fuel mix, other changes;
reductions in other greenhouse gases not itemized above
-157.8
Subtotal:  all reductions (gross) -466.8
Increases due to growth in income per capita*** +214.7
Increases due to growth in population*** +29.2
Total net reductions 1990-2008 -273.7
* through 2000; ** through 2008; *** energy-related CO2 emissions through 2008; all other items are for the Kyoto
gases estimated through 2010
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In the first place, the table shows that Germany had two major successful government
interventions:  the economic transformation of eastern Germany following unification in 1990;
and the promotion of renewable energy.  These two account for an estimated 113 and 109
Mt/year41 of reductions, respectively, and together represent 61% of the emissions reductions
attributable to government interventions (see Table 1).  In addition, there is a third successful
policy to be explained:  the setting of an ambitious reduction target of 25% of CO2 emissions in
1990 (later modified to 21% of greenhouse-gas emissions), which underlay all the climate
policies.  Second, the table shows that three of Germany's most highly touted policies were
largely ineffective:  the ecotax, voluntary agreements with industry regarding CO2 emissions,
and emissions trading, which produced only modest reductions in emissions (totaling only 26
Mt/year, 7% of the total reductions).  In fact, those policies achieved much less than did two
unsung successes, methane reduction in landfills and the reduction of nitrous oxide emissions in
the adipic acid industry (30 and 26 Mt/year, respectively); although deserving further research,
they are beyond the scope of this article.
Third, as indicated in the last few lines of the table, increased income and consumption
canceled out many of the emissions reductions from efficiency improvements.  Per-capita income
grew by more than 28% from 1990 to 2008, and this increased annual CO2 emissions by an
estimated 215 megatons, more than counterbalancing the 160 megatons in reductions due to
increased energy efficiency.  As a result, emissions reductions in household heating,
transportation, and electricity were much smaller than they otherwise would have been.
In the following sections, these nine cases of success and failure will be explained in ways
that illuminate issues in theories of environmental outcomes (see Table 2).  The three success
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cases described above (target setting, eastern German transformation, and renewable energy) will
be used to argue for the importance of external events and advocacy coalitions, and to specify the
paths through which green parties matter.  The three cases of flawed policy making (the ecotax,
voluntary agreements, and emissions trading) will be analyzed to show the ways that
neocorporatism can undermine environmental outcomes.  Finally, the effects of socioeconomic
trends on emissions in three sectors (household heating, transportation, and electricity) will be
analyzed to show how increased consumption in the absence of government policies that regulate
technological change can undermine climate-policy outcomes.
Table 2:  Cases and Theoretical Issues Addressed
Type of Case Policy Area Theoretical Issues Addressed
Policies that were relatively
successful





Renewable energy External events, advocacy
coalition, left-libertarian parties
Policies that were relative failures Voluntary agreements Neocorporatism
Emissions trading Neocorporatism
Ecological tax Neocorporatism









Explanation of Successes and Failures
Emissions target setting
Beginning in 1990, German officials set a series of ambitious targets for reducing carbon
dioxide and other greenhouse-gas emissions.  In 1990, the German parliament and Christian-
Democratic-led government agreed to cut national CO2 emissions from energy use by 25% over
the 1987-2005 period.  Later, as part of the EU's burden sharing agreement, this goal was
weakened somewhat, to a 21% reduction in the emissions of the six Kyoto-regulated greenhouse
gases over the 1990-2010 period.  Beginning in 2002, this target was supplemented with a target
of a 40% reduction from 1990 to 2020, conditional on an EU commitment to 30% reductions in
the same time frame.42  Since the 1990s, the ambitious reduction targets have represented a
consensus among Germany's governing parties, and have been supported by a wide range of
governing coalitions:  conservative-liberal (until 1998 and again from 2009), social democratic-
green (1998-2005), and conservative-social democratic (2005-09).
The very broad, cross-party advocacy coalition for climate policy developed in response to
several unusual external focusing events concerning the environment and environmental
protection that coincided in 1985-86.  In March 1985, the Vienna Convention on ozone-depleting
substances was adopted and two months later, British scientists announced the discovery of
ozone hole over Antarctica with an article in Nature, which spurred public attention to the
issue.43  Next, a January 1986 report by the respected German Physical Society warned of climate
change and rising sea levels.  This triggered much media coverage, which sparked public
attention and fears.44  Then, in April 1986, the disastrous Chernobyl nuclear accident occurred,
focusing public and elite attention on environmental problems in West Germany, which was one
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of the Western European countries receiving the greatest amount of radioactive fallout, along
with Austria, Greece, and the Scandinavian countries.45  Then, in December 1986, international
negotiations on targets for ozone-depleting gases began, raising the political salience of both
ozone and climate protection, issues which were often linked in public discourse at this time.46 
Driven by these events, public support for environmental protection reached a peak in the late
1980s.47
In response to these events, a broad advocacy coalition for climate policy formed and
achieved the adoption of ambitious emissions targets.48  Two months after the Chernobyl
accident, the conservative-liberal government, led by Helmut Kohl (CDU), created the Federal
Environment Ministry, which strengthened those in the administration who favored ozone
regulation and other global environmental policies.49  In October the next year, the Bundestag
created a parliamentary inquiry commission to examine ozone and climate change, headed by
Bernd Schmidbauer (CDU).50  As is typical, the commission consisted of experts and politicians
from all parliamentary parties and operated mainly by consensus.51  In the area of climate
protection, the commission integrated the results of 150 studies involving over 50 research
institutes.  Its final report called for Germany to reduce CO2 and methane emissions by 30%
compared with 1987 rates, comprehensively reform its energy policy, and adopt an electricity
feed-in law to assist renewable energy, and established an interministerial working group on CO2
reduction.52
The consensus that developed within the commission on those targets and measures
stretched from the Greens on the left to the conservative Christian Democrats.  These odd
political bedfellows had a common interest in strict emissions goals, the Greens in order to
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promote environmental protection and the Christian Democrats in order to promote nuclear
power, an energy source classified as not emitting greenhouse gases.53  The parties joined to
endorse the commission's main recommendations, except on preserving nuclear energy as a
solution to global warming, which the Christian Democratic and Liberal members endorsed but
the Social Democrats and Greens opposed.54
The commission's report and the cross-party consensus that it embodied set in motion a
major commitment to climate policy.  In 1990, the federal cabinet and the Bundestag adopted a
target of reducing energy-related carbon-dioxide emissions by 25% from 1987 to 2005, a goal
reiterated in a unanimous Bundestag vote in November 1991.55  The ambitious reduction goal
became the basis of climate-protection policies adopted beginning in 1991.56  Later, the 21%
reduction target was a cornerstone of the government's broad climate-policy programs announced
in 2000, 2005, and 2009.
Economic transformation of eastern Germany
The single largest contribution to greenhouse-gas reductions came not from climate policy,
but from the economic transformation of the former East Germany.  Like the emissions target
setting, this was triggered by dramatic external events that were not predicted and cannot be
directly explained by structural factors.  The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and
multiparty elections in East Germany in March 1990 led to the economic unification of East and
West Germany, via currency reform in July and political unification by treaty in October.  East
German industry collapsed beginning in Spring 1990, and an agency of the federal government,
the Treuhandanstalt, transferred most East German enterprises from state ownership under
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central planning to private ownership operating in a market economy.57
These events and the policy responses to them sharply reduced greenhouse-gas emissions
in the former East Germany.  Emissions declined sharply due to a combination of industrial
collapse, the ending of energy subsidies, privatization, and the subsidized restructuring of the
energy sector.  The extension of pre-existing policies to the new eastern states, such as the 1983
Ordinance on Large Combustion Plants (amended in 1990), also spurred the shutdown of lignite
power plants.  In addition, key actors in the economics and interior ministries helped shape the
energy-policy aspects of unification.58  The government made massive investments in the energy
sector, which reduced emissions but would have been difficult to justify in terms of climate
protection alone:  renovation of old buildings, replacing lignite with natural gas in household
heating, replacing all central power plants, and investments in cogeneration facilities.59  As a
result, energy-related CO2 emissions fell 41% in the eastern states from 1990 to 2004, with the
entire decline occurring by 1996.60
Renewable energy
Of all the policies that were intended to reduce emissions, those promoting renewable
energy were by far the most successful.  Early policies included government funding for research
and development in the 1980s and investment subsidies for a 100-megawatt wind program and a
1,000-roof solar photovoltaic program in 1989.  A crucial advance was the 1991 Electricity Feed-
In Law, which required utilities to purchase electricity from renewable sources at prices equaling
90% of consumer retail prices.  This law was comprehensively overhauled and strengthened by
the Social-Democratic-Green government in the 2000 Renewable Energy Sources Act, which
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guaranteed feed-in prices for twenty years and distributed the costs of wind power subsidies
among consumers served by all energy companies rather than those closest to the turbines.61 
With the 2000 act, the German government set a target of doubling the share of electricity from
renewable sources from 6.25% in 2000 to 12.5% in 2010.62
These policies were very effective.  Renewable-energy production grew at an average
annual rate of 11% from 1997 to 2008 and had reached 9.5% of Germany's final energy
production in 2008.63  The 12.5% of electricity target was exceeded in 2007.  Wind and biomass
were responsible for almost all the increase; hydroelectric power was stable in this period, as was
nuclear power.  According to government estimates, renewable-energy production was avoiding
109 Mt of greenhouse-gas emissions per year by 2008.64  Germany has been a leading country in
renewable energy for the last two decades, ranking second in the world in total installed wind
capacity and first in solar photovoltaic capacity in 2008.65
Strong renewable-energy policies were adopted and effectively implemented because a
strong advocacy coalition developed, partly in unpredictable ways, and the policies that it gained
further strengthened the coalition.  The 1991 Feed-In Law was the result of an initiative by an
unusually broad coalition, which included the federal Green and Christian Democratic parties
and the trade association of hydroelectric producers.  The latter, who also received guaranteed
feed-in tariffs under the law, were spurred into action by an 1987 announcement by the electric
utilities that they would no longer be increasing their payments for hydroelectric power, which
put constraints on small hydro plants.66  Advocates secured support for the legislation from
deputies in all Bundestag parties and gained grudging acceptance from Christian-Democratic
leaders in parliament and the economics ministry.67
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The advocacy coalition also benefited from the surprising inactivity of the large utilities on
the 1990 Feed-In Law.  The large utilities generally opposed policies promoting renewable
energy, because of their own large investments in coal and nuclear power plants.  The Feed-In
Law increased the utilities' costs and opened opportunities for new electricity producers, and
hence most large utilities vigorously tried to roll back the law in the late 1990s and to prevent its
expansion in 2000.  However, the large utilities did not mobilize against the Feed-In Law in
1990, when they might have nipped it in the bud, because they underestimated the effect of the
law on wind-power development and were preoccupied with taking over the eastern German
electricity producers.68
Moreover, the 1991 law strengthened the advocacy coalition for renewable energy by
creating a market for wind turbines and solar photovoltaic cells and hence reducing their costs,
and by spurring interest-group formation and mobilization.  Hence, when large utilities and the
federal government tried to reduce the feed-in subsidies in 1997, they were met by a coalition of
wind turbine suppliers and operators, solar energy producers, metalworkers, farmers,
environmental and religious organizations, and the large Equipment and Machinery Producers
Association (VDMA).  The coalition drew 4000 people to a demonstration in Bonn and defeated
the proposed cuts in a Bundestag committee.69
The advocacy coalition for renewable energy reached a new level of influence after the
1998 parliamentary elections, in which the Greens received 6.7% of the vote and joined in a
national coalition government with the Social Democrats.70  Under that government, a series of
major climate policies were enacted, including a 100,000 roofs program for solar photovoltaic
and the 2000 Renewable Energy Sources Act.71  The coalition supporting the 2000 act included
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the metalworkers union, the Equipment and Machinery Producers Association, Land politicians,
environmental organizations, and even one utility company (Preussen Elektra); it overcame
strong opposition from the BDI and most large utilities.72
Voluntary agreements, emissions trading, and ecological tax reform
By contrast, three major and widely cited policies yielded disappointing results in terms of
emissions reductions.  The voluntary agreements with the industrial associations to reduce CO2
emissions, participation in the European emissions trading system, and ecological tax reform
together produced only an estimated 26 Mt/year of reductions by 2010.  The relative
ineffectiveness of these policies was due largely to resistance by organized business interests,
which gained major concessions in the policy-making phase and sometimes failed to comply in
the implementation phase.  This casts doubt on the argument that neocorporatism benefits
environmental performance, which will be considered furthered in the conclusions.
Although German industry was broadly supportive of the government's emissions
reduction targets beginning in the early 1990s, it sought to avoid any measures that would
increase production costs and put it at a competitive disadvantage against manufacturers in other
EU economies.  Hence, the BDI preferred voluntary agreements rather than mandatory policies,
and worked consistently against fiscal and regulatory measures to achieve major reductions.  It
argued that domestic measures should be voluntary and that any binding measures should be
adopted at the international level rather than in Germany first.73  Indeed, industry was able to
extract four major concessions from both the Kohl and Schroeder governments in return for
making the voluntary agreements:  no energy taxes and no heat utilization ordinance for industry
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in return for the 1995-96 agreements, and no mandatory energy audit ordinance and no lifting of
the ecotax's exemptions for industry in return for the 2000 agreements.74
Moreover, the industrial associations insisted that the voluntary agreements be weak in
several ways.  Most important, the targets agreed to were mostly very unambitious.  The
reductions promised in 1995-96 were smaller than those indicated by the trend in increasing
industrial energy efficiency since 1970.  In fact, the promised reductions had been largely
achieved already by 1995, through the economic transformation of eastern Germany and
compliance with regulations, rather than due to any additional voluntary measures.75  In addition,
the agreements were not legally binding, and monitoring and compliance were sometimes weak. 
Although the German power industry agreed to reduce CO2 emissions by 20 Mt/year through
increases in cogeneration by 2005, instead, its emissions increased by 30 Mt/year.76
The voluntary agreements are a good example of how neocorporatism can affect
environmental performance, since they were negotiated and implemented through well-
developed corporatist procedures.  Initial negotiations in 1995 involved 15 trade associations,
including the powerful association of electricity producers VDEW, and by 1996, the agreements
covered associations responsible for 80% of industrial production.77  The peak association BDI
negotiated and signed the agreements, acting as intermediary between the government and
individual trade associations.78
For similar reasons, the outcomes of the first round of emissions trading (2005-07), in
which the German government moved to implement the European Emissions Trading System,
were also meager.  Opposition from German industry and the coal miners' union, along with
business arguments about the need for international competitiveness, led the government to press
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for extremely generous allocations of emissions permits.79  Hence, industry and the energy sector
gained overall reduction targets that were even smaller than those in the voluntary agreements,
only about 1.5 Mt/year.80
A similar influence for industry and the power sector is visible in the ecological tax
reform, adopted in 1998.  This revenue-neutral measure raised energy taxes, lowered social-
security taxes, and channeled about 10% of the tax revenue to renewable-energy projects.  In the
first place, the BDI and DIHT strongly opposed any kind of energy or CO2 tax unless it were
done at the OECD level, in order to protect the competitiveness of German industry.81  Even
though such a tax had been included in the conservative-liberal government's coalition agreement
in January 1991, industrial opposition successfully prevented the tax throughout the 1990s.82 
After Chancellor Kohl left office, the BDI and VDEW campaigned strongly against the tax when
it was introduced in 1999 by the SPD-Green government led by Gerhard Schröder.83
Lobbying by economic interest groups is also evident in the weak form that the ecological
tax reform took, which protected those sectors most exposed to international competition.  As
adopted in 1999, it exempted coal completely and required manufacturing industry to pay only
20% of the full rate, which was increased to 60% in 2003.  As a result, the tax was not related to
the carbon content of fuels or assessed equally across different kinds of emitters; it fell mostly on
gasoline and diesel fuel.84  Moreover, the size of the tax is rather modest.  It raised Germany's
total environmental taxes only from 5.8% of tax revenue in 1998 to 7.3% in 2004, which placed
the country only 12th out of 30 OECD countries.85
Socioeconomic trends in transportation, housing, and electricity
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Finally, many of the reductions achieved through government interventions were canceled
out by increases in emissions due to socioeconomic trends.  Three major trends unfolded
independently of climate policy in the 1990-2006 period:86  a rise in income and household
consumption, unregulated technological change producing new, energy-intensive products, and
an increase in international competition and trade.87  Together, these led to a 244 Mt/year
increase in emissions, which offset emissions reductions due to increased energy efficiency.
Probably the most powerful socioeconomic process that tended to increase emissions was
the rise in income.  GDP per capita rose by 23%, and its effects, coupled with those of consumer
culture, can be seen in many areas.  Private car ownership increased by 21% and passenger-
kilometers driven rose 24%.  Moreover, due partly to trends in technology and marketing, new
passenger cars became 41% more powerful and the share of four-wheel drive vehicles rose from
3% to 11% of the nation's fleet.88  Despite a comprehensive and relatively attractive public
transportation system, the share of passenger travel by car and airplane actually rose slightly in
this period, from 84.2% to 85.4%.89
Growth in freight transportation was even larger, with a 67% increase in freight volume
(ton-kilometers).  Road freight grew much faster (by 79%) than train or barge freight (which rose
16 and 30%, respectively).  Hence, the share of freight hauled by trucks, which is associated with
the highest emissions per ton-kilometer, rose from 62% to 70%.90  As a result of the various
trends toward physical growth in transportation, emissions in the transportation sector declined
by only 7 Mt/year (4.5% of the baseline) -- in spite of large efficiency improvements, including a
20% decline in CO2 emissions per kilometer in passenger cars over the 1991-2005 period.91
Rising incomes also tended to increases household energy consumption.  Households
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became smaller (fewer persons per household) and housing units larger as people moved from
rented apartments to houses.  This trend was especially strong in eastern Germany, where many
fled urban high-rise apartment buildings for new suburbs, a pattern that also increased the
demand for transportation.92  Hence living space per person rose by 15% from 1990 to 2005;
together with a 3.4% population increase, this contributed to a 9% rise in residential fuel use.93 
These sources of increase offset some of the reductions in emissions due to energy-efficiency
improvements and fuel switching away from lignite.94  Hence total CO2 emissions by households
for heating declined only moderately, by about 16 Mt/year, or 12%.95
In addition, unregulated technological change drove a 15% increase in total electricity
consumption in Germany, which lacks a comprehensive electricity conservation policy. 
Consumption rose across all sectors due to the development and dissemination of new electrical
products, both producer and consumer goods.  Households increased their use of electrical
appliances, including air conditioning, cell phones, and other devices that are rechargeable or use
energy in standby mode.  Hence, they increased their use of electricity by 21%.96  Similarly, the
rise of information technology in offices, commerce, and industry produced an 18% increase in
electricity consumption in the service sector and a 10% increase in manufacturing and mining.97 
These sources of increases offset the emissions reductions due to the energy sector's fuel
switching away from lignite to natural gas; therefore, emissions in the electricity sector declined
by only 7% from 1990 to 2007.98
Theoretical Conclusions
External focusing events, advocacy coalitions, and structural change
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These conclusions examine the theoretical issues raised earlier, each in light of those cases
most relevant to it and with concern for issues that cut across the cases.  The case studies have
four main implications for theories of environmental outcomes, especially in areas with broad
economic costs and high conflict potential, such as climate protection. 
First, external focusing events and advocacy coalitions should have a central role in
theories of strong environmental performance; indeed, they may be necessary for major
improvements.  Ambitious target setting and the promotion of renewable energy, which comprise
two of the three most successful cases in Germany, resulted from combinations of extraordinary
external events and the formation and development of advocacy coalitions.  The relative strength
of advocacy and opposing coalitions depends in part on their economic bases, with advocacy
coalitions likely to gain strength as the renewable-energy and energy-efficient economic sectors
grow.  Hence, differentiated analyses of those economic bases are needed, and the ways that
policy feedback affects economic sectors and their political organizations deserves more
theoretical attention.
The economic transformation of eastern Germany, which yielded major "wall-fall benefits"
for climate policy, shows the importance of external events in a different way.  Rather than
sparking the formation and growth of am advocacy coalition, the events that led to unification
triggered rapid structural change which in turn produced massive emissions reductions.  This was
possible because of major structural differences between East and West Germany in democracy,
affluence, and pre-existing laws, as well as the availability of technical solutions to the problem
of high emissions.
While structures matter for environmental outcomes, those structures sometimes change
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through rapid processes triggered by events external to environmental policy.  Another example
comes from the U.K., which is the Western country with the second greatest emissions
reductions (down 18% from 1990 to 2008).  There, the privatization of the coal, gas, and
electricity industries and the liberalization of energy markets in the 1990s led to a massive switch
from coal to natural gas, which produced about half of Britain's greenhouse-gas reductions over
the 1990-2000 period.99
Green parties
The German case supports the conclusion that green or left-libertarian parties help produce
stronger environmental performance.  In addition, the cases help develop the theory by showing
that these parties do so through at least four different mechanisms.  First, the Greens spurred
electoral competition on environmental issues.  Their entry into the party system in the early
1980s, on the heels of the intense and sometimes violent conflicts over nuclear energy, led the
established parties to try to make up for lost time.  The Christian Democrats and Social
Democrats quickly adopted environmental positions in an effort to contain or undermine the
Greens.  During the 1980s, the Christian Democrats moved strongly to regulate SOX emissions
in an effort to limit forest dieback, while the Social Democrats backed off their earlier support for
nuclear energy.100  This set the stage for the consensus on climate policy that emerged in the
inquiry commission in the late 1980s and the adoption of the feed-in law.  Therefore, although
the major parties were key actors on climate protection from the late 1980s onward, this reflects
the Greens' prior influence on those parties rather than the unimportance of the Greens.
Second, in Germany the Greens were a crucial actor within the environmental and climate-
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protection advocacy coalitions, using their institutional position in parliament and later in the
federal government to provide key political resources.  Third, when the Greens participated in a
national coalition government from 1998 to 2005, they had a large hand in the burst of
innovations in climate policy that resulted.101  Fourth, green-party strength is a variable that
depends on election results, not merely a structural factor.  The Greens' strong election result in
2002, in which the party increased its vote share from 6.7% to 8.6%, strengthened its position
within the coalition with the Social Democrats.  After the election, the Greens successfully
pressed for a further expansion of renewable energy, the adoption of a 40% emissions reduction
goal, emissions trading, and a halving of the ecotax exemptions for industry, agriculture, and
forestry.102
Neocorporatism and advocacy coalitions
The third main theoretical conclusion concerns neocorporatist institutions.  While large-N
studies are divided about their effects, the cases analyzed here show that such institutions can
retard climate-policy performance by limiting both effective policies and their implementation. 
Industry opposition prevented, delayed, or weakened many climate-policy measures, including an
industrial heat ordinance, the ecotax, mandatory energy audits, emissions trading, and quotas for
cogeneration.  Associations representing traditional sectors such as coal, electricity generators,
and heavy industry, acting through the BDI and their trade associations, used their organizational
strength and entrenched positions to resist change.  While business has enjoyed corporatist-style
access, environmental organizations were largely relegated to pluralist-style pressure from the
outside, assisted by the Greens and other members of the advocacy coalition.103
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The German cases suggest that if neocorporatism does not improve environmental
performance on the whole, this may be because its benefits in creating stable, consensual
environmental policies are counterbalanced by disadvantages.  Business and labor are more
strongly organized than environmental organizations and have better access to government
decision-makers; hence, neocorporatism may operate differently on environmental than on
economic issues.104  As Armingeon writes, most or all producer groups may oppose
environmental policies due to their perceived costs.105  Consensual institutions such as
neocorporatism aid environmental policy only if and when environmental issues become part of
the consensus.  This points back to the importance of the processes by which advocacy coalitions
are formed, gain strength, and may come to dominate certain policy areas.
Indeed, on the whole, the roles of business and labor in German climate policies give more
support to the advocacy-coalition framework than to the neocorporatist theory.  The mobilization
of business opposition and the of climate-policy proponents were key factors, and they varied
across the cases for reasons that are contingent rather than due to structural causes such as the
interests of particular economic sectors.  In the two areas where government interventions were
highly successful in reducing emissions, the mobilization of business was extraordinarily weak. 
In the economic transformation of eastern Germany, business was marginalized by the massive
role of government investment in pursuit of the deeply held national goal of political and
economic unification, which was made possible by the unexpected collapse of the East German
system.  In the case of renewable-energy policy, the utilities were caught napping concerning the
1991 Feed-In Law, and later, their vigorous opposition in the late 1990s was narrowly overcome
by the growth of an remarkably broad advocacy coalition that engaged in an effective
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combination of protest tactics and routine politics.
To the extent that the neocorporatist-pluralist dimension is relevant to environmental
outcomes, it should be studied as a process related to advocacy-coalition formation, and not only
as a structural feature.  In Germany, the rise of the Greens and the development of the climate-
policy advocacy coalition created changes in interest intermediation.  During the SPD-Green
government (1998-2005), environmental organizations in Germany gained more access to
officials than before and gained influence on some aspects of climate policy.106  The shift in the
interest-group system has gone beyond the years of the SPD-Green government, with the
electricity utilities and their associations in political decline since 2005, renewable-energy
interests creating more centralized organizations, and increased transparency in environmental
decision-making benefiting the environmental organizations.107
Finally, strategic choices and political conflict are also important in these changes, as
shown by the changing position of business on climate policies.  German industry publicly
endorsed the government's climate policy while more quietly resisting it for 15 years, then shifted
to a radical rejection of it during a burst of vigorous, high-profile opposition in 2005, and more
recently moved toward a deeper acceptance of the government's policies.  The political processes
surrounding the 2005 election campaign can explain these rapid shifts.  According to news
reports and industry documents, two weeks before the Bundestag elections in September 2005,
the DIHK and BDI hoped for a conservative-liberal majority to replace the red-green government
and went on the offensive against the government's climate and other environmental policies. 
They called on the federal government to give the "economic basis of sustainability" priority over
Germany's international role as an environmental pioneer, to reduce the ecological tax, and to
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drop its target of a 40% reduction in greenhouse-gas emissions by 2020.108  However, the
business campaign was met with resistance from leaders in all the political parties, and the
Bundestag election resulted in a grand coalition of conservatives and Social Democrats.109 
Hence, industry abandoned its anti-climate-policy offensive after the elections and moved toward
greater acceptance of environmental policy.  In 2007, the BDI created a climate-policy initiative
and commissioned a study by the consulting firm McKinsey which argued that the wider
adoption of available technologies would make it possible to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions by
26% in 2020 (compared with 1990) at minimal cost.110
Rising incomes, consumption, and expanding international trade
The final theoretical conclusion is that certain common kinds of socioeconomic change in
rich, Western, industrialized countries -- and the lack of government policy addressing them --
deserve more attention in theories of environmental performance.  Increasing incomes,
unregulated technological change, and the expansion of international trade tend to increase
greenhouse-gas emissions by increasing passenger car travel, road freight transportation,
household heating and cooling, and electricity consumption.  These trends, which were
demonstrated in the German case, are quite general.  For example, almost all of the 22 high-
income OECD countries had substantial increases in passenger car travel and in road freight
transportation over the 1990-2004 period.111  Electricity consumption also increased in all these
countries, with a total rise of about 30% in the OECD European countries over the 1990-2007
period.112  These increases in consumption tend to counteract any reductions in greenhouse-gas
emissions due to efficiency improvements.  Governments in industrialized democracies generally
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have not undertaken strong policies to limit road transportation, electricity consumption, or the
size of dwellings, and both the causes of their inaction and any exceptions deserve more study.
These findings also show that the effects of national income on environmental
performance in the area of climate protection are deeply ambivalent.  In the 1990s, Jänicke and
colleagues viewed climate change as a prosperity-pollution problem, which worsens as incomes
rise because there is no available technical solution that does not adversely affect core economic
interests.  However, by the late 2000s, greenhouse-gas emissions appeared to comprise a mixed
case in the richest countries, fitting neither the prosperity-pollution nor the environmental
Kuznets theories.  By 2007, five high-income, western, industrialized countries had clearly
passed their peaks in greenhouse-gas emissions (Germany, Britain, Sweden, Belgium, and
France), yet 13 others remained on trajectories of increasing emissions.113  Moreover, climate
protection is a mixed case within countries, too.  This is shown by the German cases and by
Jahn's recent study of 21 highly industrialized OECD countries, which shows that industrial CO2
emissions follow an inverted U-shaped curve as incomes rise, while CO2 emissions from
transportation rise continuously.114  It appears that while governments and industry follow an
environmental Kuznets curve, the mass of individual households still follow a prosperity-
pollution curve.
Summary
This article has attempted to enhance the dialogue between large-N studies and case
studies of environmental outcomes, seen as complementary approaches to developing theories. 
Case studies can help show that processes such as dramatic external events, political interactions,
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and socioeconomic change are important, and hence that structural explanations are inadequate
by themselves.  Case studies also help delineate the multiple mechanisms and paths through
which causal factors operate, and highlight the interactions between different factors, such as the
ways that political processes modulate the effects of dramatic external events.  Given the
complexity of the climate-policy area and the dearth of outcomes studies, at this point we need
more country-specific studies that compare the effects of different government interventions in
reducing greenhouse-gas emissions.  With those in hand, we could carry out more productive
cross-national comparisons of successes and failures.
The case-study analyses done here suggest that present theories should be modified in four
ways.  External events and advocacy-coalition formation should be included as key processes,
and there are at least four specific causal paths through which green parties improve
environmental quality should be investigated.  We also need to examine the ways that
neocorporatism can hinder environmental performance and that advocacy-coalition formation
can change patterns of interest intermediation.  Finally, we need to place more attention on rising
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